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Youth Bulge in Sub-Saharan Africa:
A Theoretical Discourse on the 




With the continued globalization of 
economies and culture, more development theorists 
have begun to shift their attention to a generational 
phenomenon called the youth bulge. This 
phenomenon has led to literature by political 
scientists, sociologists, and security theorists who 
study potential conflict or development for which a 
youth bulge may ultimately be a catalyst. 
Traditionally, the majority of youth bulge research 
has focused on the regions of North Africa and the 
Middle East. This theoretical discourse focuses on 
six Sub-Saharan African states that have a present 
youth bulge and attempts to provide development 
discussions on three of them. The analysis aims to 
forecast whether Nigeria, Burundi, and Sudan have a 
tendency to move towards a demographic dividend 
or demographic bomb in the future. Content 
analysis from the lenses of modernization, 
dependency, and world-systems theory are used 
while considering the measures of GDP per capita, 
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unemployment of youth, fertility rates, and political 
stability/ absence of violence.
Introduction: 
At the young age of 8 years old, George Bull 
was coerced into joining a militia in the early days 
of the Liberian civil wars. Any potential childhood 
innocence that Bull may have possessed was ripped 
from his hands and replaced with an AK-47 
(Chicago Tribune 2008). His life, education, and 
experiences were not valued by the rebels, rather, 
Bull was seen more as human capital to further the
ambitions of violent leaders. From fighting under 
the anti-government forces to enforcing their 
authoritarian rule once Charles Taylor took control 
of the country, George Bull had been one of 15,000 
child soldiers who transitioned into adulthood 
knowing the horrors of war (Chicago Tribune 
2008). Child soldiers like Bull were just a fraction 
of the youth-dominated civil wars. The “revolution” 
started by Charles Taylor and approximately one 
hundred men would soon explode into chaos, 
characterized by young people fighting each other 
and inciting terror (Sommers 2011). This way of 
life dictated Bull’s world for thirteen years, where 
he would experience the loss of 200,000 lives, the 
proliferation of 700,000 refugees, and the 




While George Bull was forced into war, 
Joshua Blahyi led it to some of its worst atrocities. 
A reverend as of 1997, Joshua Blahyi was a warlord 
during the First Liberian Civil War and was known 
as “General Butt Naked” for going into battle with 
no clothes on, wearing shoes, and carrying his gun
(Chicago Tribune 2008). An opponent of Charles 
Taylor, the notorious General Butt Naked 
commanded his army of mostly child soldiers, 
killed 20,000 people, conducted human sacrifices, 
and committed other brutal human rights violations 
(Toweh 2016). Living once more in the country he 
had previously caused so much pain in, Rev. Joshua 
Blahyi has tried to provide food, clothing, and 
shelter for jobless former fighters (Chicago Tribune 
2008). Many of these ex-combatants were once 
child soldiers and now have reached the age of 
young adulthood. After the Second Liberian Civil 
War ended in 2003, approximately 70% of Liberia’s 
population was 30 years old or younger, an 
estimated 88% of youth in the country were 
unemployed, and many young adults and children 
felt alienated from older generations who perceived 
them as exhibiting rebel behavior (Sommers 2011). 
While some like Rev. Joshua Blahyi were 
able to transition into a profession and even have 
the resources to attempt to take care of their 
community, the vast majority like George Bull were 
left behind. People echo the thoughts of Bull, who 
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has said that he “wants to work but there are no 
jobs” and that he doesn’t “have enough money to go 
back to school to study.” (Chicago Tribune 2008). 
The issue of extremely high youth unemployment 
rates, youth dissatisfaction of their income, and 
youth frustration with the status quo are not unique 
to Liberia but are also found in other states across 
the globe (Yifu Lin 2012). Many credit this to the 
demographic phenomenon where a significant 
portion of a country’s population is young people 
entering the workforce, better known as the youth 
bulge (Yifu Lin 2012). However, a youth bulge 
theoretically does not have to result in social and 
political instability (Yifu Lin 2012). Several 
economists, think tanks, and educational institutions 
believe that a youth bulge can be capitalized on to 
further a nation’s development and economic 
growth (Johns Hopkins University 2019). In the 
course of this paper, I will attempt to apply several 
theoretical perspectives of development towards 
this idea of the youth bulge and determine whether 
or not certain factors within a state may make a 
youth bulge result into a demographic bomb.
Development and Population:
Modernization Theory
Before approaching a phenomenon like the 
youth bulge, an understanding of development 
theory must be established. The first of the three 
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major paradigms of development is modernization 
theory. American economist, government official, 
and political advisor Walt Whitman Rostow 
conceptualized modernization theory in his work 
“The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-
Communist Manifesto” (Your Dictionary: 
Biography 2019). Rostow’s five stages-of-growth 
was the foundation of this work and the goal was to 
convince developing nations that liberal 
democracies lead to prosperity while single-party 
communist rule leads to stagnation (Your 
Dictionary: Biography 2019). Traditional society, 
preconditions for takeoff, takeoff, drive to maturity, 
and age of high mass-consumption make up the five 
developmental stages that modernization 
champions, leaving no room for “Third World” 
nations to be nuanced and potentially skipping 
stages (Rostow 1960). According to Rostow’s ideas, 
if a nation did not follow these exact steps than they 
would forfeit the potential of becoming a wealthy, 
developed, and high-consuming nation like the 
United Kingdom or the United States. 
Traditional societies are defined as 
comprising of pre-Newtonian social structures with 
limited innovation that does not have access to 
modern sciences, its uses, and its current
perceptions of the world (Rostow 1960).
Civilizations from the Bronze Age, Antiquity, 
Medieval Ages, and other eras that predate the 
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Newtonian world consist of an economy that is
based on agriculture and craftsmanship with 
centralized political power, making them traditional 
societies. Preconditions for takeoff is the second 
stage, one that begins to let go of regional identities, 
begins to adopt nationalist views, and a 
centralization of government takes place (Rostow 
1960). Education becomes more accessible and 
manufacturing dominates traditional craftsmanship 
in preconditions for takeoff, prompting Rostow to 
point to the late seventeenth and early eighteenth-
century Western Europe as examples of this second 
stage. In the third stage, takeoff is fueled by 
technological advances that serve as catalysts for 
rapid industrialization, increased investment, and 
commercialized agriculture (Rostow 1960). While 
in the takeoff, demand for democracy begins to 
fester among populations and centralized 
governments begin to weaken. Drive to maturity 
occurs forty to sixty years after takeoff. This stage 
is characterized by increases to standards of living, 
urbanization of the state, emergence of new 
industries, a materialization of the service sector, 
investment into the global economy, proliferation of 
political revolutions, and shifts toward liberal 
democracies (Rostow 1960). The final stage, age of 
high mass-consumption, is achieved once maturity 
is accomplished and a state is modernized. This 
social structure is dictated by consumers, 
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entrenched in bureaucratic processes, consisted of a 
service-based economy, and specialized to promote 
skill labor, a social welfare state, and modern 
technological advancement (Rostow 1960). 
Dependency Theory
Andre Gunder Frank, an economist and 
sociologist, believed that Rostow was too idealistic 
and functionalistic in his belief, resulting in Frank 
constructing a conflict-centered approach to 
development. This paradigm of thought would be 
known as dependency theory and centered its 
argument on the notion that many nations around 
the world were not developing (Frank 1969). Frank 
focused on the idea that many developmental 
scholars before him were ignorant of the historical 
significance that impacted the structure of 
“underdevelopment countries.” The current 
developed nations had never been underdeveloped 
compared to their contemporaries, only ever being 
undeveloped (Frank 1969). Now, having existed in 
a state of underdevelopment compared to the West, 
countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and other 
regions were in a position that made them easily 
exploitable. This was only made easier by the 
penetration of capitalist institutions into the cultures 
of underdeveloped (Frank 1969). According to 
Frank, the vulnerability of underdeveloped nations 
led to a satellite and metropolis state relationship.
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During the age of colonialism, a metropolis-
satellite relationship could be explained as the 
controlled structure held up by colonizers to be used 
against the colonized. Metropolis cities located in 
developed Europe extracted resources and labor 
from satellite colonies, furthering the development 
in the metropolis (Frank 1969). One such example 
is the colonial relationship between Spain and 
Chile. Spain, the metropolis, formed a structural 
relationship with Chile, its new satellite, which 
exploited the indigenous people for its raw 
resources, agricultural land, and accessible labor. 
Spain’s continued development and economic 
growth because of their position of power were 
disproportionately faster and more efficient than 
Chile’s, who was already at a disadvantage. As time 
progressed into modernity, metropolises only 
improved with exponential development while 
satellites fell into a more dramatic level of 
underdevelopment (Frank 1969).
Frank’s perception of current development 
in the global arena was shaped by this 
understanding of history and unequal relationships 
between the metropolis state and their satellites. 
Colonies only enabled further development and, had 
it not been for them, metropolises would not have 
grown at the rate they had historically. Frank argued 
that Western development and economic growth 
relied on the exploitation of satellites that had their 
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resources stripped away from them, showing a clear 
flaw in modernization’s assertion that the five 
stages-of-growth can be applied to any country 
(Frank 1969). In a state of dependency to their 
former colonizers, underdeveloped satellites rely 
too much on metropolis states, causing a lack of 
development and a relationship of unequal 
exchange. The only way to solve this issue, 
according to Frank, is for underdeveloped nations to 
remove themselves from the external actors that are 
solidifying their disadvantaged status in the world 
(Frank 1969).
World-Systems Analysis
Believing that the developmental paradigms 
established did not explain globalization and its 
processes sufficiently, the historical social scientist 
and sociologist Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein 
conceptualized world-systems analysis 
(Iwallerstien.com). Wallerstein’s theory was 
predicated on the idea that a hierarchical, capitalist 
world-economy exists to maintain global inequality, 
further unequal exchange, and uphold an inherently 
exploitive structure (Chase-Dunn 2019). Unlike 
Frank and dependency theorists, Wallerstein 
asserted that former colonies could develop despite 
external relationships with Western developed 
nations. However, rather than being classified 
rigidly between satellites and metropolises, 
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Wallerstein interpreted a nation’s status in the 
capitalist world-economy as either core, semi-
peripheral, or peripheral (Chase-Dunn). The 
classifications under world-systems analysis 
allowed more room for interpretation and flexibility 
when trying to categorize countries within these 
labels.
Core nations are on the top of the global 
hierarchy due to their level of development, 
standing within the global division of labor 
(service-based), and ability to take advantage of 
unequal exchange (Wallerstein 2012). Just on the 
outside of the core countries are states in the semi-
periphery. Semi-peripheral nations can be 
characterized as going through a period of 
development, industrialization, and mechanization 
(Wallerstein 2012). Furthest from the core lie 
periphery countries, who fill the global need for 
agricultural production in order to sustain food 
consumption in the core and semi-periphery. 
Nations that fall in the periphery tend to lack 
significant economic growth and development due 
to the need for a significant division of labor within 
the capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein 2012).
The unequal exchange that is ever-present in 
Wallerstein’s world-systems analysis forces 
peripheral countries to remain in perfect 
competition with one another while also attempting 
to entice foreign investment from NGOs, 
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multinational corporations, and core states. 
Kondratieff cycles (k-waves), or periods of cyclical 
downturns and growth, is a consequent 
phenomenon in semi-peripheral and peripheral 
nations (Wallerstein 2012). Core nations do not 
have to significantly worry about k-waves since 
they had developed to a degree where political 
stability is present, strong social safety nets exist, 
and dramatic increases in poverty are preventable. 
World-systems analysis points to the ever-present 
threat of negative k-waves and the current practice 
of unequal exchange as hindering development in 
the semi-periphery and ceasing development 
altogether in peripheral nations (Wallerstein 2012).
Population
Separate from the paradigms of 
development are fundamental theories on 
population. A basic understanding of population is 
essential to approach the phenomenon that is the 
youth bulge. Population is defined in this study as 
the number of people in a country (Merriam-
Webster.com 2019). The growth of a population is 
the increase in the number of inhabitants within a 
country (The Law Dictionary 2017). Although the 
youth bulge was defined earlier as a significant 
portion of a country’s population existing as young 
people entering the workforce, the specific age 
group that will be categorized under this 
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phenomenon is the population of a country from age 
15 to age 24. For a country to have a youth bulge, 
the age group of 15 to 24 must make up at least 
19% of the country’s population and the country’s 
population pyramid must have a heavy base. A 
youth bulge will theoretically result in two results, a 
demographic dividend or a demographic bomb. A 
demographic dividend occurs when  family size 
begins to decrease and life span increases. This can 
be taken advantage of by capitalizing on the 
increase in human capital, incorporating women 
into the labor supply, encouraging saving, and 
investing in economic growth, women’s 
empowerment, and health and educational services 
(Johns Hopkins University 2019). If a youth bulge 
doesn’t take advantage of a demographic dividend 
when the opportunity presents itself, a youth bulge 
will result in a demographic bomb. A demographic 
bomb has an oversaturated workforce, resulting in 
very low employment and income for young people 
ages 15 to 24. This results in a frustrated young 
populace, leading to political instability, social 
stagnation, and negative economic growth (Yifu Lin 
2012). 
Inquiry of Research:
Having established the theoretical 
understandings of development and population, the 
primary inquiry for this research is if certain 
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developmental indicators suggest whether a youth 
bulge will transform into a demographic dividend or 
demographic bomb.
Methods:
The six countries that will have data 
presented, analyzed, and interpreted include the 
following Sub-Saharan countries: Liberia (19.27% 
population 15-24), Nigeria (19.03% population 15-
24), Rwanda (19.29% population 15-24), Burundi 
(19.24% population 15-24), Uganda (20.30% 
population 15-24), and Sudan (20.15% population 
15-24). Understanding that each region of the world 
has an innumerable number of social factors that 
contribute to its youth population and the impact 
youth have on society, it is reasonable to narrow 
down this study to one region in the world. Sub-
Saharan Africa was chosen due to a lack of youth 
bulge literature on the topic of this region. In 
contrast, North Africa and the Middle East have 
been where youth bulge scholars have designated 
the majority of their attention. Furthering theoretical 
findings in a region where the youth bulge is 
prevalent serves to promote more empirical 
researchers to dedicate attention to Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Additionally, the specific six Sub-Saharan 
African countries were chosen through a stratified 
random sampling of countries in this region of 
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Africa and can be classified as having a youth 
bulge.
In order to analyze country reports obtained 
through the World Bank, content analysis will be 
applied for this study. This method of quantitative 
analysis aims to interpret macro-country level data. 
Specifically, longitudinal changes every ten years 
will be observed from the years 1995 to 2015. 
Procedures from longitudinal analyses at a country 
level have been shown to be a valid way to conduct 
comparisons between countries over time (Yang-
Hansen, Kajsa, and Gustafsson 2008). In regards to 
the study of globalization and development, 
country-level content analysis has been applied to 
interpret quantitative data previously without the 
need to run regressions (Ramsaran 2004). For a 
study that aims to use several developmental lenses 
to interpret and explain the youth bulge, the method 
of context analysis is prioritized to further 
theoretical debate rather than other forms of 
quantitative methodology and tests.
GDP per capita (4/24/2019 US$) is one 
measure that will be analyzed as an indicator for a 
state’s direction towards demographic dividend or 
demographic bomb. Observing economic growth or 
stagnation of a country and its populace aids in 
interpreting the impact of a large youth cohort on a 
state’s future development and stability (Weber 
2012). A youth bulge that coincides with youth 
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economic marginalization has been shown to
increase social and political unrest in a country 
(Sukarieh 2017). If economic uncertainty is reduced 
and economic opportunities become more available, 
the tendency for youth to challenge the prevailing 
social structure is not as prevalent. With this line of 
reasoning, the measurement of GDP per capita is a 
consistent, accepted, and efficient variable for 
content analysis. 
Unemployment of youth (ages 15-24), is the 
second measure that will be observed for this 
macro-country level content analysis. Although 
there are several critiques for using unemployment 
as a measurement (primarily due to a positive 
correlation between unemployment and education 
existing), increasing employment opportunities is 
still a chief concern that needs to be addressed 
(Kilimani 2017). Ultimately, a correlation between 
two social consequences, such as higher 
unemployment with higher education, is not vital 
when interpreting the feelings, status, and intentions 
of an uncertain youth population. Research has 
shown that alarming unemployment rates tend to 
have “multiplier effects” on instability associated 
with a population’s youth bulge (Lagraffe 2012). 
Considering these findings, the measurement of 
unemployment of youth is a grounded variable to 
interpret the potential of demographic dividends and 
demographic bombs. Unemployment will be 
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classified as a measure for its relationship with 
demographic dividend or demographic bomb.
Fertility rates (births per woman) is another 
measure that will be analyzed as to investigate if a 
state is more or less inclined to enter into a 
demographic dividend. Reduced fertility rates are a 
defining characteristic in youth bulge countries 
approaching demographic dividend. If a country 
with a substantive youth bulge is seeing increases in 
its fertility rates over time, then the possibility for 
the demographic dividend is reduced dramatically 
(Inayatullah 2016). Fertility rates must decrease 
within a youth bulge, otherwise, a demographic 
bomb becomes more likely. 
The last measurement that will undergo 
content analysis is the World Bank’s political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism
measures. Overall, the goal of this measure is to 
understand the perceived likelihood of political 
instability and politically motivated violence in a 
state. Ranges for the political stability and absence 
of violence/terrorism measures are at a -2.50 for 
weak governance and stability and +2.50 for strong 
governance and stability. Once a youth bulge has 
reached approximately 20% of an adult population, 
corruption begins to destabilize political institutions 
within a country (Farzanegan 2017). With this 
information, an assertion is made that youth bulge 
countries are more likely to be unstable. However, 
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if there has been a positive change in stability over 
time, a country may be more primed for a 
demographic dividend rather than a demographic 
bomb. Since these findings have been found before, 
this will be the last measure for suggesting whether 
or not a youth bulge is leaning toward a 
demographic dividend or demographic bomb. 
Political instability is the defining result of a youth 
bulge becoming a demographic bomb, making this 
an ideal measurement.
Data:
GDP per capita (4/24/2019 US$)








































































Liberia 3.81 3.51 3.17 -8.55%
-
10.73%
Nigeria 8.989 9.037 16.296 0.53% 44.54%
Rwanda 0.647 1.357 1.839 52.32% 26.21%
Burundi 0.647 1.357 1.839 52.32% 26.21%
Uganda 3.042 3.05 2.641 0.26%
-
15.49%
Sudan 31.208 31.7 26.962 1.55%
-
17.57%
Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor 
force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate)
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Nigeria 6.262 5.985 5.591 -4.63% -7.05%





Burundi 7.288 6.69 5.781 -8.94%
-
15.72%
Uganda 7.018 6.583 5.682 -6.61%
-
15.86%





Fertility rate, total (births per woman)
*Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism
Estimate of governance (ranges from 




Data in the tables are provided courtesy of the
World Bank1
1 "World Bank Open Data." The World Bank. 
Accessed April 22, 2019. 
https://data.worldbank.org/.

















Nigeria -1.06 -2.03 -1.88 48.11% -8.33%




















*No data for 1995. Subsequently, 1996, 




After observing each country’s data on GDP 
per capita, youth unemployment, fertility rates, and 
political stability, it is difficult to make a conclusive 
argument whether any of these variables make a 
significant impact on deciding a youth bulge’s fate 
of demographic dividend or demographic bomb. A 
content analysis will be made concerning how the 
most unstable states (those closest to -2.50 
governance performance) are at risk of demographic 
bombs with the appliance of at least one 
developmental paradigm. The case studies that are 
the most unstable states are identified as Nigeria, 
Burundi, and Sudan.
Nigeria
After drastically reducing the poverty rate 
from 66.9% to 12.5% in the late 1990s/early 2000s, 
Nigeria has begun to see an increase in its poverty 
rates once again (Omoju and Abraham 2014). From 
2004 to 2010, Nigeria’s poverty level increased to 
14.6%. This mostly impacted the large youth 
population, who have also struggled with the 
nation’s corruption, poor infrastructure, increasing 
unemployment, drug trafficking, sex trafficking, 
and inefficient government policies (Omoju and 
Abraham 2014). Inaccessibility to education and 
reproductive healthcare have only worsened the 
state of things in Nigeria, causing some to consider 
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that the potential demographic dividend is more 
likely to become a demographic bomb (Omoju and 
Abraham 2014). Separatist aspirations in several 
regions of the country, ethnic tensions, and religious 
conflict also suggest that further instability may be 
experienced in the future (BBC News 2019).
Nigeria’s 2015 governance performance is 
at -1.88, making it extremely weak and susceptible 
to political instability. Although GDP per capita 
increased by over $1000 between 2005 and 2015, 
youth unemployment increased by almost 50% in 
that same time frame. Additionally, Nigeria’s 
fertility decreased by only 4.63% from 1995 to 
2005 and by 7.05% from 2005 to 2015. 
Modernization theory would likely argue that since 
economic growth has been increasing significantly 
in the country, the other consequences are part of 
the “growing pains” that occurs when development 
takes place (Kentor 2001). Dependency and world-
systems analysis would likely have a different take 
on these results. Both may argue that an 
accumulation of wealth by a smaller, economic elite 
has skewed the GDP per capita scale towards 
growth. Along with this social hierarchy within the 
country, not once have fertility rates decreased by at 
least 10% during the two ten-year intervals. With 
19.03% of its population falling within the 15-24-
year-old age group, Nigeria’s youth bulge seems to 
miss its chance at a demographic dividend. While it 
11th Edition
121
could focus on women’s empowerment, providing 
jobs for young people who seek it, and resolving its 
internal strife, the nation seems to focus on 
increasing its GDP despite still being at threat of 
political and social instability.
Burundi
The time after Burundi achieved 
independence has been a turbulent one. Following 
decades of civil war occurring between the Hutu 
and the Tutsi, Burundi continued to experience 
instability and violence. Civilians would receive the 
majority of the causalities, resulting in 1.2 million 
people displaced and 300,000 people dead (Voors 
2012). The Hutu and Tutsi leaders’ focus on the 
three-decade conflict to defeat their rival resulted in 
reduced interest in development and domestic 
investment. Youth in Burundi have begun to 
disassociate peace and progress with the 
government altogether (Uvin 2007) This is likely 
due to the ethnic civil war that plagued the nation 
for the entirety of these youth’s lives. It is difficult 
for a government without legitimacy to effectively 
govern and uphold stability within its borders.
Burundi’s 2015 governance performance is 
at -1.97, displaying how the extremely weak 
government in the country has not recovered from 
the civil war. Out of every country sampled, 
Burundi has the lowest GDP per capita in 2015 
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($304.37), smallest growth over the ten-year 
intervals (-11.50%, 50.56%), and highest fertility 
rate in 2015 (5.781). Youth unemployment is still 
very low, but this can be attributed to traditional 
agriculture dominating the state’s economic 
landscape (Heritage Foundation 2019). A 
modernization perspective of Burundi’s current 
state would be that it is the country’s fault for 
straying away from the five stages-of-growth and 
investing its time into an ethnic conflict. In contrast, 
dependency theory and world-systems analysis 
would acknowledge Burundi had become dependent 
on its colonial power before reaching independence. 
After becoming independent, Burundi did not have 
the institutions in place to prevent an ethnic conflict 
of such a large scale. Even now, with their three-
decade civil war finished, Burundi is not in a state 
to achieve a demographic dividend. Rather than a 
violent demographic bomb, the war-exhausted 
youth bulge will likely continue to struggle and 
remain impoverished. Not being able to provide for 
its increasing population, Burundi has the potential 
for a demographic bomb that will force the current 
regime to collapse in and on itself if substantive 
economic growth for young people is not achieved. 
Sudan
Sudan has had several regime changes over 
the course of its history. Much of this can be 
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accredited to the extension of Islamic imposed 
beliefs on the country’s populace (Collins 2019). 
This caused conflict with the predominantly 
Christian southern region of Sudan, who incited 
civil wars from 1955 to 1972 and 1983 to 2005 
(Collins 2019). While the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005 to end the 
second civil war, it was not until 2011 that a formal 
referendum occurred resulting in the South Sudan’s 
independence (Ottaway and Hamzawy 2011). 
Recently, inflation caused the Sudanese pound to 
plummet in value (BBC News 2019). This led to the 
government enacting austerity measures on a 
population that was already struggling financially. 
Protests began to erupt throughout the country and 
became more prominent throughout 2018. In early 
2019, support for Sudan’s long-time dictator, Omar 
al-Bashir, had deteriorated so much that even the 
National Security and Intelligence Services of the 
country called for him to resign (BBC News 2019). 
Refusing to step down, thousands of young 
demonstrators began to protest on April 6th, 2019 at 
the al-Bashir’s compound. Several days later, on 
April 11th, the military arrested and ousted Omar al-
Bashir from office, leaving much uncertainty for the 
future of the country (BBC News 2019). He was in 
power for 29 years. 
Despite its struggles with inflation, Sudan 
has seen the largest 10-year change in GDP per 
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capita (72.96%) from 2005 to 2015. However, 
youth unemployment was still at 26.96% in 2015 
and the apparent instability was displayed in the 
country’s governance performance score 
(-2.34). 20.15% of Sudan’s population are in the 15-
24 age group. With growing economic insecurity 
and a fourth of the country’s youth unemployed, 
Sudan is seeing the effects of a dissatisfied youth 
bulge. According to modernization theory, the lack 
of following Rostow’s model for development is the 
main reason why this political instability is so 
prevalent. However, similar to Burundi, the lack of 
transitional institutions has left Sudan in a state 
where stability is not an option. This only 
perpetuates its status as a periphery nation and 
causes the country to be dependent on more 
developed nations in order to develop further. Omar 
al-Bashir’s failure to further development can be 
interpreted as the prime reason for his ousting by 
youth dominated demonstrators. The pressure they 
placed on the military to intervene was enough for 
the weak government to fall. I would argue that 
Omar al-Bashir’s resignation and arrest is an 
example of a peaceful demographic bomb. Sudan 
now must establish a new regime. If a military-
government is put into place, the peaceful 
demographic bomb may become violent. In 
contrast, a peaceful transition of power into a 
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regime decided by Sudan’s people may open the 
doors to a demographic dividend.
Conclusion:
My primary inquiry of determining whether 
certain developmental indicators suggest whether a 
youth bulge will transform into a demographic 
bomb cannot be confirmed. Using content analysis 
on a macro-country level, there were no patterns 
found in the data that I observed. This limitation 
and lack of a definitive pattern derive from the 
exploratory nature of this study. This does not mean 
that there were no findings, however. Economic 
insecurity (both youth unemployment and GDP per 
capita) and high fertility rates despite decreasing 
fertility still were prevalent in countries with high 
political instability that were at risk of igniting a 
demographic bomb. Each of the countries that 
operate under weak governance also had ethnic or 
religious conflicts embedded in its identity. This 
pattern, though not included in our original data, 
showed how a nation’s historical background and 
social structure may have an impact on the youth 
bulge. Including a measurement for the presence of 
ethnic/religious conflicts would be added in future 
research. To prevent social and political instability, 
countries with a youth bulge may opt to work 
towards demographic dividend. By empowering 
women, investing in health and education, and 
11th Edition
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providing employment opportunities, this can be 
achieved. Several institutions and theorists have 
supported this notion. To do so, dependency on 
external actors would need to be relieved to better 
focus on independent, domestic development while 
also working towards sustainable policy solutions. 
However, as stated before, a country will likely 
need to come to peace with its ethnic/religious 
conflicts before being able to pursue the 
demographic dividend. Dependency theory and 
world-systems analysis lend insight into how this 
may be achieved. Frank and dependency theorists 
would likely suggest that countries with a youth 
bulge that are currently underdeveloped should 
become independent from their relationship with 
their former colonizer states. From this point, a state 
with the potential to achieve demographic dividend 
should invest in the policies that help reach it (i.e. 
women empowerment, health and education, etc.). 
However, as Wallerstein explains in world-systems 
analysis, core countries still rely on the production 
from periphery states. This would make it difficult 
for a state experiencing underdevelopment and 
potential for demographic dividend to secure its 
economic independence. Ever-present economic 
competition among periphery countries establishes 
risk for a country that aims to remove itself from the 
current world-system. Rarely has the colonial and 
capitalist world-system been challenged and, even 
11th Edition
127
less frequently, has a challenge been sustained. 
However, when many states have joined together in 
resistance, we have seen sustained opposition. 
Perhaps a stronger, more centralized African Union, 
African Economic Community (AEC), or Pan-
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